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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
The Utah Court of Appeals h a s jurisdiction over this appeal under Utah
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(k).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

Are Appellants entitled to appeal from the Amended J u d g m e n t on

Special Verdict, with Additur ("Amended Judgment"), where they accepted the
proposed additur with a reservation of the right to appeal?
Standard of review:

By their nature, the appealability of an order, and

standing to appeal, are questions of law which the trial court does not decide, and
which the appellate court decides de novo.
2.

Did the trial court err in awarding an additur of $15,000 to a verdict

of $17,000, where it made no findings that the jury was motivated by prejudice or
passion, and there is no evidence of prejudice or passion?
Standard of review:

The trial court's decision to award an additur, or in

the alternative a new trial, is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See Crookston v.
Fire Insurance Exchange. 817 P.2d 789, 802-05 (Utah 1991); Tolman v. Salt Lake
County Attorney. 818 P.2d 23, 26-27 (Utah App. 1991).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
The following rule is determinative of the issues presented for review:
Rule 59(a)(5) and (6), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure:
New trials; amendments of judgment.
(a)

Grounds.
Subject to the provisions of Rule 6 1 , a new trial may be
granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of
the issues, for any of the following causes; provided,
l

however, that on a motion for a new trial in an action
tried without a jury, the court may open the judgment if
one has been entered, take additional testimony, amend
findings of fact and conclusions of law or make new
findings and conclusions, and direct the entry of a new
judgment:
(5)
Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to
have been given u n d e r the influence of passion or
prejudice.
(6)
Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or
other decision, or that it is against law.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This personal injury action arose out of an intersection collision on J a n u a r y
30, 1989. Appellee Coral Terry (Terry") alleged that the accident caused personal
injuries, including a degenerative disc condition, for which she sought special and
general damages. The trial court granted Terry a directed verdict on the issue of
the parties' negligence, and submitted the issues of causation and damages to the
jury. On May 28, 1992, the jury returned a verdict finding Appellants' negligence
to be the proximate cause of her injuries, and awarded special damages of
$12,000 and general damages of $5,000.
On J u n e 2, 1992, Terry moved for an additur in an unspecified amount, or
a new trial, claiming that the damages awarded were inadequate (the Request for
Additur is attached hereto as Addendum "A"). In its Ruling on that motion, the
trial court granted an additur of $15,000, or if Appellants refused the additur, a
new trial (the Ruling dated July 23, 1992 is attached hereto as Addendum "B").
The trial court made no findings that the jury had acted under the influence of
passion or prejudice, nor did it explain its rationale for the amount of the additur.

2

On August 14, 1992, Defendants appealed from the ruling granting an
additur, or in the alternative, from the Judgment on Special Verdict of J u n e 12,
1992. The Utah Supreme Court summarily dismissed that appeal (in Case No.
920387) in a n order dated October 13, 1992, holding t h a t the appeal was
premature and that the Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction.!

After the case was

remitted back to the trial court, Appellants filed their Acceptance of Additur on or
about November 9, 1992 (the Acceptance of Additur is attached as Addendum
"C"), following which the trial court entered the Amended Judgment, from which
the present appeal is being taken. The Amended Judgment was signed December
2, 1992 and entered December 3, 1992, and is attached hereto as Addendum "D.w
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This personal injury case arose out of an intersection collision on J a n u a r y
30, 1989, involving vehicles driven by Terry and Appellant William Bowles
("Bowles"), an employee of Appellant U S WEST Communications, Inc.

Terry

claimed various soft tissue injuries, the most significant of which was a
degenerative disc condition in her cervical spine.
The trial evidence demonstrated that while Terry had the legal right of way
at the intersection, Bowies' view of oncoming traffic was partially obstructed (R.
574-76, 788-789), whereas Terry's view was not obstructed (R. 725, 727). Yet

1

The order stated in its entirety as follows:
Plaintiffs motion for summary dismissal is this day granted. Initially,
defendants did not respond to the granting of the additur, but objected and appealed
when plaintiff filed a motion for new trial because defendants had not responded. The
trial court's ruling, granting defendants until September 23, 1992, to respond was
proper in reponse [sic] to plaintiffs motion which left the case before th [sic] trial court.
This appeal is therefore premature, and this court lacks jurisdiction. (R 314)
3

Terry did not even see Bowies' vehicle after it came to a stop at the stop sign
controlling the intersection (R. 727). Terry's own expert witness conceded on
cross-examination that Terry may have had sufficient time and capacity to see
and avoid Bowies' vehicle as it emerged from the intersection (R. 505-07). The
evidence also showed that the collision occurred at a relatively low speed (under
10 mph for the Bowles' vehicle (R. 427-29, 579, 786), and approximately 25 mph
for the Terry vehicle (R. 724-25)), and that the Terry vehicle continued traveling
forward after the impact, until Terry pulled it over to the curb (R. 708, 727-28).2
Three days after the accident, Terry first visited Dr. Lyle J a c o b s , an
orthopedic surgeon and her former employer (R. 525-27), who diagnosed a cervical
strain and prescribed an anti-inflammatory medication and physical therapy (R.
528).

Terry attended nine or ten physical therapy sessions over about four

months (R. 711, 729), after which she ceased further treatment. During the three
years following the first visit to Dr. Jacobs, Terry visited him only twice, on April
12, 1990 (R. 534) and J a n u a r y 24, 1991 (R. 547, 549). Each time Dr. Jacobs
diagnosed her injury as a cervical strain (Ex. 20), and admitted at trial that that
was the only diagnosis he had made (R. 548).
Following the last consultation on J a n u a r y 24, 1991, Dr. J a c o b s referred
Terry for a magnetic resonance imaging test because of her continued complaints
of pain (R. 536). The MRI revealed slight evidence of a degenerative disc condition

2

At the trial, the Court prohibited Appellants* accident reconstruction expert from
testifying, on the basis of a minute entry in the Court's file regarding designation of witnesses
(the pre-trial order prepared by Terry's counsel and signed by the Court did not impose any
deadlines for designation of witnesses). The Court also severely limited the scope of expert
medical testimony from the only physician called by Appellants (R. 372, 364). See Berrett v.
Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad. 830 P.2d 291 (Utah App. 1992).
4

(R. 549, 590, 636, 674). According to Dr. Charles Smith, whom Terry called as an
expert witness, the condition likely predated the accident (R. 650). It was his
opinion that the accident aggravated the condition and made it symptomatic (R.
598, 650-51, 656).
On the issue of special damages, the evidence showed t h a t Terry had
incurred actual medical expenses of about $4,700 (R. 646), of which about $3,000
represented the cost of a "neurostimulator" obtained about two weeks prior to
trial, which the prescribing physician acknowledged was experimental (R. 618).
The remainder of claimed medical special damages was for possible future
treatment, including a possible future disc fusion surgery (R. 539-40, 608-14).
The evidence on lost wages showed that Terry had lost no actual wages (R. 68889), but took a few compensated sick days shortly after the accident and some
other time for physical therapy (R. 681, 684-85, Ex. 19). There was some evidence
that Terry's salary for the fiscal year in which the accident occurred declined by
about $8,000 because of a decline in her employer's business that year, which her
employer attributed to lost sales resulting from Terry's injuries (R. 688-89). There
was no evidence of actual expenditures for household services or other out-ofpocket losses (R. 743).
On the issue of general damages, the evidence showed t h a t Terry had
consulted a physician only three times in the first three years following the
accident (R. 543), and that the only diagnosis from the treating physician, a board
certified orthopedic surgeon, was of an ordinary cervical strain (R. 547). The
suggestion of degenerative disc disease was not made until two years after the

5

accident (R. 536, 539, 549, 669); furthermore, Dr. Smith, who was called by Terry,
acknowledged that the degenerative disc condition pre-dated the accident (R. 598,
650, 656), which was consistent with other evidence that Terry had been involved
in several prior accidents causing injury to the same area of her cervical spine (R.
537, 753-60).3 The evidence also showed that Terry had attended only nine or ten
physical therapy sessions (R. 711, 729), and that she had ceased physical therapy
within about four months after the accident (R. 729). Additionally, with the
exception of a sample of an anti-inflammatory medicine given to her by Dr. Jacobs
on her first visit to him (R. 712), the only medication she took for pain was overthe-counter Tylenol® (R. 731). The evidence of Terry's functional disability (as
opposed to anatomic impairment, of which there was virtually no objective
evidence) was purely subjective.
At the close of evidence, Terry moved for a directed verdict on the issue of
negligence of both parties, t h e n later withdrew the motion a s to her own
negligence (R. 817). However, at the trial court's urging (R. 823), Terry renewed
the motion as to her negligence, which the trial court then granted, holding that
she was not negligent as a matter of law, and that Bowles was negligent as a
matter of law (R. 823). Having t h u s removed the issue of comparative negligence
from the jury, the court then submitted the case to the jury for determination of
proximate cause and damages. The jury returned a verdict finding that Bowies'
negligence was the proximate cause of the accident, and awarding total damages

3 Dr. Wing, a radiologist called by Appellants, agreed that the degenerative disc
condition pre-dated the accident. (R. 674)
6

of $17,000, consisting of $12,000 for special damages and $5,000 for general
damages (R. 913-14).
On J u n e 2, 1992, Terry moved for an additur in an unspecified amount, or
a new trial, claiming that the damages awarded were inadequate (R. 212). In its
Ruling on that motion, the trial court granted an additur of $15,000, or if
Appellants refused the additur, a new trial (R. 259-60). The trial court made no
findings that the jury had acted under the influence of passion or prejudice, nor
did it explain its rationale for arriving at the amount of the additur. Rather, the
court simply stated:
This matter is before the Court on the plaintiffs motion for an
additure [sic] or in the alternative, a new trial.
The matter of liability was directed by the Court. The issue of
causation of plaintiffs injury by the defendant was found by the jury
and an award of $12,000.00 for specials and $5,000.0 [sic] general
damages was made.
The foregoing was based on the Court's instructions that on the
finding of causation the j u r y was to assess damages for the full
amount of plaintiffs injuries although the defendants [sic] negligence
may have aggravated or light [sic] u p a latent, dormant, or
asymptomatic condition.
In assessing such damages the jury awarded only little more
t h a n half the medical and other special damages testified to by the
only witnesses on this point called by the plaintiff.
The jurors [sic] assessment of general damages did not take into
a c c o u n t the pain and suffering of plaintiff to date, nor t h a t
attributable to the surgery, as testified to by Dr. Smith.
Based on the foregoing considerations the Court grants the
plaintiffs motion and directs that the sum of $15,000.00 be added to
the judgment or if defendant refuses such additure [sic], the Court
grants a new trial of this matter.
Following dismissal of their appeal from the above ruling (on grounds the
appeal was premature), Appellants filed an Acceptance of Additur in whi*

they

stated their intention that the acceptance was solely for the purpose of obtaining

7

appellate review of the additur, and which expressly reserved the right to appeal
from the Amended Judgment in the following language:
Defendants William C. Bowles and U S WEST Communications,
Inc. hereby accept the conditional additur ordered by the Court in its
Ruling dated July 23, 1992, b u t reserve their right to appeal from the
amended judgment that will be entered incorporating and reflecting
such additur, and do not intend hereby to waive any such right of
appeal.
This election is made as a result of the order of the Utah
Supreme Court dated October 13, 1992, which summarily dismissed
Defendants' appeal from the original judgment on the grounds that
the appeal was premature and that the Supreme Court therefore
lacked jurisdiction. That ruling implied t h a t the only m e a n s of
obtaining appellate review of the order granting an additur is for
Defendants to make an election between a new trial and an additur.
Based on the Supreme Court's statement in State v. General Oil Co..
22 Utah 2d 60, 448 P.2d 718, 719 (1968) ("We need not determine
whether or not the court's ruling [granting] an additur was erroneous
inasmuch as that issue has now become moot by the trial de novo/),
Defendants believe that the Supreme Court might refuse to review the
additur if Defendants elected a new trial; therefore, it appears that the
only other alternative means of obtaining appellate review is by
electing an additur and appealing from the amended judgment.
(R. 325-26)
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
1.

Appellants are entitled to appeal from the Amended J u d g m e n t which

incorporated the additur ordered by the trial court, even though they accepted the
additur, reserving the right to appeal, in order to obtain appellate review of the
additur. The Amended Judgment is a final, appealable order. Under applicable
Utah law, Appellants could not obtain appellate review of the additur if they had
elected a new trial, since a new trial would have mooted the additur issue. Hence
the only means to obtain appellate review of the additur was by accepting the
additur with a reservation of the right to appeal. Appellants did not waive their
8

right to appeal, nor are they estopped from appealing, since Terry did not rely to
her detriment on any actions of Appellants, and justice requires that Appellants
have an avenue to obtain appellate review of the trial court's additur order that
quadrupled the general damages awarded by the jury.
2.

The jury verdict in this case, which awarded Appellee both special

($12,000) and general ($5,000) damages for her claimed soft tissue injuries, was
fully justified by the evidence, including evidence t h a t her primary treating
physician diagnosed nothing more than a cervical strain resulting from the
accident (R. 548, Ex. 20), that she only sought treatment from a physician three
times in the first three years following the accident (R. 543), and that she took no
pain medication other than non-prescription Tylenol® (R. 731). Thus the jury
verdict was not so inadequate as to indicate a disregard of the evidence, nor
passion or prejudice. Indeed, the trial court made no findings that the jury verdict
was the product of passion or prejudice. Absent such findings, the trial court is
not permitted to grant an additur.

Therefore, the trial court abused its discretion

in ordering an additur.

9

ARGUMENT
I.

APPELLANTS MAY APPEAL FROM THE AMENDED JUDGMENT.
In her motion for summary affirmance, Terry raised the issue whether

Appellants are entitled to appeal from the Amended Judgment, where they
accepted the additur. The Utah Supreme Court denied that motion, but deferred
ruling on the issues raised by it until plenary presentation of the case.
Curiously, Terry suggested that a party who elects to accept an additur
instead of a new trial benefits from the election. That is not necessarily so.
Election of an additur or remittitur generally means that the electing party merely
prefers the certainty of an amended judgment to the uncertainty and additional
expense of a new trial. Actually, it was Terry who benefitted from the $15,000
additur in this case, not Appellants. However, in this case it is irrelevant whether
Appellants would benefit from their election, since the election was made not to
avoid a new trial, but to enable them to obtain appellate review of the additur.
More importantly, an appeal from the Amended Judgment is the only means
available to obtain appellate review of the granting of the additur.
A.

If Appellants were not permitted to appeal from the Amended
Judgment that incorporated an additur, they would have no
means of obtaining appellate review of the additur.

No Utah case establishes a rule of law that prohibits a party from appealing
from an amended judgment which incorporates an additur accepted by that party
with reservation of the right to appeal. Appellate courts in other jurisdictions
frequently entertain appeals from trial courts' grants of additur without requiring
litigants to endure the time, trouble, and expense of an alternative new trial. See

10

r a.9 Sears. Roebuck & Co. v. Moten. 558 P.2d 954 (Ariz. App. 1976) (On appeal,
appellate court entertained appeal from trial court's grant of additur and vacated
such grant where it created an unjust result); Smallwood v. Dick. 761 R2d 1212
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Furthermore, implicit in the fact that appellate courts entertain appeals from grants
of additur is the notion that grants of additur are indeed appealable orders. For appellate
courts which have considered appeals from a grant of additur in addition to those cited in the
discussion accompanying this footnote, see, e.g., Thomas v. Seav. 369 S.E.2d 680 (S.C. App.
1988) (Appellate court entertained additur and held, inter alia, that defendant did not waive
right to new trial by appealing order for new trial nisi additur); Foster v. Amcon Intern.. Inc..
621 S.W.2d 142 (Term. 1981) (Intermediate appellate court entertained appeal from trial court's
grant of additur and State Supreme Court considered subsequent appeal on additur issue);
Jacobsen v. Manfredi by Manfredi. 679 P.2d 251 (Nev. 1984) (Appellate court considered appeal
from trial court's grant of additur); Bullard v. Grisham Const. Co.. 660 P.2d 1045 (Okla. 1983)
(Intermediate appellate court and State Supreme Court considered appeals from grant and
affirmance of additur, respectively, which grant of additur was characterized as an alteration of
award).
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an additur would become moot. See State v. General Oil Co.. 22 Utah 2d 60, 448
P.2d 718, 719 (1968) ("We need not determine whether or not the court's ruling
[granting] an additur was erroneous inasmuch as that issue h a s now become
moot by the trial de novo.") Thus the only means of challenging the trial court's
granting of an additur is to appeal the amended j u d g m e n t incorporating it.
Furthermore, judicial economy suggests that an additur be appealable without
having to endure a new trial, since the duplication of time, expense, and effort in
conducting a new trial would be utterly wasted if it were later determined that the
court had erred in granting an additur.

In the present case, Terry would be

satisfied with the Amended Judgment, whereas Appellants would be satisfied with
the original judgment. Hence neither side wants to endure the risks and costs of
a new trial, and neither should be forced to do so j u s t to determine the validity of
the additur.
The Rules of Appellate Procedure support the conclusion that an amended
judgment incorporating an additur is appealable. Rule 3 permits appeal "from all
final orders and judgments, except as otherwise provided by law." Rule 4, which
concerns the time for appeal, provides in subsection (b):
If a timely motion under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is filed in
the trial court by any party . . .
(3)
under Rule 59 to alter or amend the judgment; or
(4)
under Rule 59 for a new trial,
the time for appeal for all parties shall run from the entry of the order
denying a new trial or granting or denying any other such motion.
(emphasis added). Note that the rule distinguishes between Rule 59 motions to
alter or amend a judgment and Rule 59 motions for a new trial. Clearly a motion
for an additur is a motion to alter or amend the judgment, and the granting of
12

such a motion has the effect of altering the judgment.

Hence the granting of an

additur is distinct from the granting of a new trial only, which is not covered under
the rule (the rule only mentions denial of a new trial as extending the time to
appeal

lh
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only a new trial, there may not have been a right of appeal. However, in this case
Teirv r n i u r s l u l
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alteration of the judgment, which is clearly appealable.
B*

Appellants did not waive their right to appeal.

Terry has asserted that by electing an additur, Appellants waived their right
to appeal from the amended judgment. That assertion totally ignores the explicit
language in Appellants* acceptance of additur that reserved the right to appeal.
Waiver is the voluntary relinquishment or a known right
1 )in I i u i IUi ,' I I I :i (5tl : e • ::i 1 9 3

See Black's Law

Appella i its w a ived their right il: : »

appeal is wholly inconsistent with what Appellants actually did, namely expressly
reserve their right to appeal
In Robison v. Garnett. 238 So.2d 58 (La. App. 1970), the court permitted a
plaintiff to appeal from a JIKI/'IIHMH dial included a irimttihu dial plaiiil
accepted under protest and with reservation of his right to appeal. The court
denied defendants' motion to dismiss the appeal, stating:
We . . . hold that the restrictive acceptance of the remittitur with full
reservation to appeal . . . is not such an acquiescence in a judgment
that would preclude an appeal . . . .
238 So,2 : 1 i it ; 59. Se t • also, Busch v. Busch Construction. Inc.. 2132 l\l W.J,d A\ 7
400-01 (Minn 1977), in which the court permitted an appeal by plaintiffs even
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though plaintiffs had accepted remittiturs. The principle followed in these cases
applies equally in cases involving additur.
C.

Appellants should not be estopped from appealing.

Estoppel is an equitable doctrine. It should not be employed to prevent a
party from obtaining justice. In the circumstances of this case, the only means by
which Appellants can obtain appellate review of the granting of a n additur is by
electing the additur with a reservation of the right to appeal, then appealing the
amended judgment that incorporates the additur. In Sequoia Manufacturing Co.
v. Halec Construction Co.. 117 Ariz. 11, 570 P.2d 782 (Ariz. App. 1977), the court
stated:
[E]ach case involving an additur or remittitur must stand or fall on its
own peculiar set of facts:
". . . . [T]he ultimate test will always be justice, and any
case before u s which shows an unjust result because of
the granting or denial or either additur or remittitur, will
be reversed."
570 P.2d at 196, quoting Creamer v. Troiano. 108 Ariz. 573, 503 P.2d 794 (1972)
(emphasis added in Sequoia). 5 This Court should take a similar approach.
Furthermore, an essential element of estoppel is that the adverse party, in
reasonable reliance on the conduct of the party being estopped, m u s t make a
substantial change in position to her detriment. See, e.g., Baggs v. Anderson. 528
P. 2d 141, 143 (Utah 1974) ("An essential requirement [of estoppel] is that there
m u s t be some conduct of the [party being estopped]

. . . which reasonably

5 In Creamer, whose facts are very similar to the case at bar, the Arizona Supreme
Court reversed the award of an additur, and reinstated the jury verdict, where the trial court
had directed a verdict against defendants on the issue of liability, then imposed an additur to
the damages awarded by the jury. The court held that the trial court had violated the
defendant's right to a trial by jury.
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[party asserting estoppel] . . . to rely thereon and make some

substantial change in his position to his detriment

I ei iy h a s not shown any

detrimental reliance or adverse change in her position as a result of Appellants'
appeal.
Terry h a s asserted that the alternatives mentioned in Haslam v. Paulsen.
"ISM 1 "'m
' il
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granted (Haslam did not involve a question of additur or remittitur), are the only
means by which Appellants < nuhl nhl.mi in/iew <tf llir additur. Those alternatives,
as stated in Haslam, are: (1) an interlocutory appeal or (2) preservation of the
claim for review upon the final outcome of the case. As to the first alternative, the
fact is that Appellants' first appeal was deemed by the Supreme Court to be an
interlocutory appeal, which was dismissed as premature; therefore, interlocutory
appeal was not a viable option in this case

t Is to the second alternai

possible to preserve a claim as to the granting of an additur while at the same
tii i I ;:!: electii lg a i iei * ti iai sii ice a i

I-* .

•

r State v.

General Oil Co.. 22 Utah 2d 60, 448 P.2d 718, 719 (1968) ("We need not
determ ii le IA 1 lethei : •] i I : t tl i s coi t.i t s i i Uing [granting] an,, nddil in w is iTRinn mi 1 ,
inasmuch as that issue h a s now become moot by the trial de novo.") Thus the
only avenue left to Appellants to obtain review of the erroneous granting of an
additur is through the present appeal.
In summary, as a result of the dismissal of Appellants* first appeal and the
trial court's order that Appellants must choose between additur and a new trial,
Appellants were left with only two choices: elect a new trial, in which event the
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additur issue would have become moot; or elect the additur with reservation of the
right to appeal. Having chosen the latter course—the only course available to
obtain appellate review of the erroneous granting of the additur—Appellants
should not now be denied that review.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN AWARDING AN
ADDITUR.
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure do not discuss additur or remittitur.

However, Rule 59(a) sets forth the grounds upon which a new trial may be
granted. Those grounds include "excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to
have been given under the influence of passion or prejudice," and "insufficiency of
the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, or that it is against law,"
which are the two grounds upon which Terry based her motion for a n additur, or
in the alternative a new trial.
The trial court did not articulate which of the two asserted grounds it relied
on to grant the additur. In its Ruling, the trial court merely observed that "the
jury awarded only little more than half the medical and other special damages
testified to by the only witnesses on this point called by the plaintiff," and that
"[t]he jurors [sic] assessment of general damages did not take into account the
pain and suffering of plaintiff to date, nor that attributable to the surgery, as
testified to by Dr. Smith." (R. 259-60)6 The trial court did not explain what it
thought the $5,000 in general damages awarded by the jury represented, if not
pain and suffering.

In any event, the trial court made no finding that the jury

6

Presumably the court was referring to a possible future disc fusion surgery, since
Terry had not had any surgery prior to trial.
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acted under the influence of passion or prejudice, nor that the evidence was
insufficient to justify the jury's verdict, nor that the verdict was "against law."
A.

Because the determination of damages is the province of the
jury, the trial court may not award an additur in the absence of
findings that the jury acted under the influence of passion or
prejudice.

It is \\; ell established that the amount of damages to be awarded in a
personal injury action is presumptively the province of the jury, and that one
challenging the jury's determination of damages bears a heavy burden of showing
that the damages awarded were outside the range of the evidence, or that the jury

Equally importantly, the trial court made no such finding.
The well-accepted .1 1 (I

.Intnl f?ritt!r;il iuli 1 » (lint 'the 1

1 nil mil

great latitude in assessing damages for personal injuries." Pauly v. McCarthy. 184
P.2d 123 (Utah 1947); see also Hilliei v. Lamborn. 740 P.2d 300 305 (I Jt .a h 1 \ pp.
1987).
Generally, the amount of the verdict is a matter exclusively for the
jury and unless such an award clearly indicates the jury's disregard of
competent evidence or the influence of passion or prejudice, the trial
court may not interfere with the jury's determination.
Battv v. Mitchell. 575 P.2d 1040, 1043 (Utah 1978); see also, Paul v. KirkendalL 1
Utah 2d 1, 261 P.2d 670 (1953); Weber Water Basin Conservancy District v.
Skeen. 8 Utah 2d 79, 328 P.2d 730 (1958J.7
In Campbell v. Safeway Stores. Inc.. 15 Utah 2d 113, 388 P.2d 409 (1964),

7

A corollary principle is that "it is the exclusive prerogative of the jury to judge the
credibility of the witnesses and to find the facts." Williams v. Llovd. 16 Utah 2d 427, 403 P.2d
166, 167 (1965). See also, Groen v. Tri-O-Inc. 667 P.2d 598, 601 (Utah 1983).
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the Court refused to find that an award of $14,053.26 for a fractured femur
resulting in permanent impairment was so inadequate as to justify an additur,
even though the plaintiff had sustained approximately $ 8 , 0 0 0 in medical
expenses. The Court stated:
Due to their advantaged position in close proximity to the trial, the
parties and the witnesses; and their practical knowledge of the affairs
of life as a background against which to weigh the evidence, the
assessment of damages is something peculiarly within the prerogative
of the jury to determine, and the court is extremely reluctant to
interfere with their judgment in that regard.
Under our system it is contemplated that the right to trial by
j u r y be assured. This is something more t h a n a high-sounding
phrase to be declaimed on patriotic occasions. It is the duty of courts
to honor it in the observance. Whenever there is genuine dispute as
to issues of fact upon which the parties' rights depend, they are
entitled to have them submitted to and settled by a jury. When the
parties have had a full and fair opportunity to present their cause,
and the jury has rendered its verdict, it should not be interfered with
unless there appears some compelling reason why justice demands
that it be done.
388 P.2d at 411-12.
A court will defer to a jury's verdict unless it is so excessive or inadequate
"as to be shocking to one's conscience and to clearly indicate passion, prejudice or
corruption on the part of the jury." McAffee v. Ogden Union Ry. & Depot Co.. 62
Utah 115, 129, 218 P. 98, 104 (1923); see also Hillier v. Lamborn. 740 P.2d 300,
305 (Utah App. 1987). Furthermore, in the absence of court findings indicating
that the jury was actuated by improper motive, prejudice, or bias in arriving at its
verdict such that would compel a finding that reasonable men and women would
of necessity

come to a different conclusion, the trial court cannot substitute its

judgment for that of the fact finder.

See J e n s e n v. Eakins. 575 P.2d 179 (Utah
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1978); see also, Dupuis v. Nelson. 624 P.2d 685 (Utah 1981) (When damage award
is not so inadequate as to indicate a disregard of the evidence by the jury, a court
is not empowered to entertain a motion for additur.); Mever v. Bartholomew. 690
, Onveabor v. Pro Roofing. Inc.

'M,1' "" i1! M!!"? H'l.-ili ,'\pp.

1990).
B.

award of special damage

inadeqi iii t e .

In the Amended Judgment, the trial court did not increase the amount of
special damages at all; the entire additur was appended to the award of general
damages.

The implication of this action is t h a t despite the tr ial court's

observation that "the jury awarded only little more than half the medical and other
damages testified to by the only witnesses on this point called by the Plaintiff," the
court did not intend that any part of the additur should represent an increase in
special damages. I Jul lining llir < asu (In nc is in Inilli i muni i I I! discuss whether
the award of special damages was adequate.
A s ; »ir

i,

el

ordered a n additur to the special damages, there would be no basis 1or a
conclusion that the amount awarded by thr jury l/fl" ' »0P) v ,n l n a d r q i n t "

Y\\v

evidence showed that Terry had incurred actual medical expenses of about $1,700
in the more than three years prior to the month before trial (R. 646); that two
weeks prior to the trial

.

otained the u s e of a n

experimental

"neurostimulator" at a cost of about $3,000 (R. 646); and that her wages had
tlioppnl h\ ,ih

il $h,i KM i I

llir 11seal yea] oil her business in which the accident
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occurred (R. 688-89). 8 The sum of those three items, which were the only out of
pocket losses on which Terry presented evidence, is approximately $12,700—only
$700 different from the actual jury award.
The remainder of Terry's claimed special damages related to projections of
future expenses relating to a disc fusion surgery, including the costs of the
surgery itself, the cost of future household expenses, lost wages during
recuperation, etc. (Ex. 14). The jury may have concluded, and probably did, that
the surgery was not reasonably certain or probable to o c c u r s or t h a t it was
sufficiently speculative, 10 that no award of special damages for its consequences
was justified. The mere fact that Terry's witnesses testified to such possible future
expenses does not compel the jury to award them, even when there was no
evidence to the contrary.

The fact remains t h a t Terry bore the b u r d e n of

persuasion on the issue of special damages.

Since her evidence of future

expenses did not persuade the jury, she should not be permitted to cure that
failure by resorting to the trial judge in a motion for an additur.

8

Terry also claimed about $1,800 lost wages for the time she took compensated sick
leave following the accident, but conceded that she did not actually lose those wages, only that
she had to use her sick leave. (R. 685, Ex. 19)
9

The trial court instructed the jury that it may consider "whether any of the [elements
of damages] will with reasonable certainty continue in the future, and if you so find, award
such damages as will fairly and justly compensate the plaintiff for the m." R. 836.
The evidence that the surgery was reasonably certain to occur was suspect, since Dr.
Smith, the physician who would perform the surgery, acknowledged that Terry had never
requested the surgery, and testified that he would not perform that type of surgery unless the
patient requested it. (R. 641-42, 776) Terry herself was equivocal about when she had decided
to have the surgery, and the jury could reasonably have concluded that she testified she had
decided to have the surgery only for the beneficial effect that such testimony might have at
trial, rather than being a preponderance of the evidence that the surgery would occur with
reasonable certainty. (R. 775-78, 721-22)
10

The jury was instructed not to award speculative damages. R. 839.
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Rule 59, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
Subject to the provisions of Rule 61 [harmless error], a new trial
may be granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the
issues, for any of the following causes: . . .
(5)
Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been
given under the influence of passion or prejudice.
(6)
Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other
decision, or that it is against law. . . .
(emphasis added)
It cannot be said in this case that the damages were awarded under the
influence of passion or prejudice, since the jury made a generous award of special
damages that virtually covered all

*e medical expenses Terry had actually

incurred to the date of trial, including the experimental "neurostimulator," (ca.

obligated to award more in special damages, j u s t because Terry's counsel pleaded
for it. 11
C.

The award of general damages is not inadequate.

It is well established that "[wjhere personal injuries involve

>f

employment, personal inconvenience, and pain and suffering, there is no set
formula to compute the amount of damages." Cruz v. Montoya. 660 P.2d 723, 726
(Utah 1983); see also. Jorgensen v. Gonzales. 1 1 lll.ih lid ;U0, JHJ I'.Ud 1KJ4
(1963). However, by awarding a $15,000 additur, the trial court quadrupled the

1

1 For example, Terry's counsel asked for loss of income damages for the time she spent
on sick leave, even though it was admitted that she lost no wages as a result of taking sick
leave. Her claim for loss of income in the future is sheer speculation. Her attorney also asked
for damages for household expenses, notwithstanding the undisputed fact that Terry's
husband had taken care of the household chores that Terry couldn't do for three years, with no
actual cost to Terry. (R. 743, 767)
21

a m o u n t awarded by the j u r y for general damages (from $5,000 to $20,000),
without providing any rationale for the amount of the additur.
The award of general damages for pain and suffering, the proof of which is
uniquely dependent on the credibility of the plaintiff, is clearly and exclusively
within the province of the jury to determine. See Batty v. Mitchell. 575 P.2d 1040,
1043 (Utah 1978) ("Generally, the amount of the verdict is a matter exclusively for
the j u r y and unless such an award clearly indicates the jury's disregard of
competent evidence or the influence of passion or prejudice, the trial court may
not interfere with the jury's determination.")^
The jury's award for general damages was well within the scope of the
evidence. It is apparent that the jury did not accord Terry's testimony of pain and
suffering, nor of her disability, much weight, nor was it obligated to do so. The
jury was not obligated to believe Terry's evidence on those issues, which was
supported only by her own subjective, obviously biased descriptions and those of
her obviously biased husband and employer, is There was precious little if any
objective medical evidence that would compel a finding of severe, chronic pain and
suffering. The expert physicians testified that the degenerative disc disease which
she had prior to the accident had changed only slightly from the time of the

12 Citing Paul v. Klrkendall. 1 Utah 2d 1, 261 P.2d 670 (1953); Weber Water Basin
Conservancy Dist. v. Skeen. 8 Utah 2d 79, 328 P.2d 730 (1958).
13

On the issue of disability, Terry's own witness admitted that the "disability" was
primarily "functional/ meaning that it related not to observable anatomic damage, but rather
was dependent on her subjective reports of inability to perform tasks, as well as her
subjective reports of pain upon being asked to perform certain range of motion tests (R 63738). Thus Terry's evidence of disability, as well as of pain and suffering, depended on her own
credibility. The jury was entitled to find her testimony not credible, and award damages
accordingly, whether or not there was contrary evidence.
22

accident to the time of the MRI two years later (R. 636, 674).
The jury undoubtedly took into account the undisputed facts that Terry only
sought medical attention for her injuries three times in the three years following
the accident; t h a t she took no medication stronger t h a n over-the-counter
Tylenol®; that with the exception of a few days in 1989, she continued to work at
the same job she held prior to the accident; and that no diagnosis of degenerative
disc disease was made until two years after the accident. Thus there is ample
evidence to sustain a finding by the jury that Terry's pain and suffering was not as
dramatic or severe or prolonged as

claimed. Simply put, the j u i y did not have

to believe Coral Terry. The jury c^nvd have concluded that her testimony of pain
and suffering was simply a natur
Nor was the jury bound tc

if-serving exaggeration by a biased party.
. higher general damages because of anything

said by Defendants' counsel in argument. The jury was properly instructed that
arguments of counsel are not evidence (R. 835), and Defendants' counsel never
stipulated to any amount as a minimum for general damages. Terry's counsel had
two opportunities in his closing argument (opening and rebuttal) to persuade the
j u r y to award a substantial a m o u n t for general damages; the fact t h a t his
argument was ineffective to convince the jury is no ground to grant an additur or
a new trial.
Cases from both Utah and other jurisdictions* 4 support the conclusion that
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Some cases from other jurisdictions that have sustained damages of $5,000 or less in
back or neck injury cases are as follows:
$5,000 was adequate damages where woman sprained neck and suffered from sporadic
back pain for at least one year after accident; ruptured disc discovered months after accident.
Malbrouffh v. Pascal. 394 So.2d 815 (La. App. 1981)
$5,000 was adequate damages where man experienced neck and upper back pain
23

the jury's award of $5,000 general damages, in addition to its award of $12,000
for special damages, is adequate under the circumstances. In J e n s e n v. Eakins.
575 P.2d 179 (Utah 1978), the Utah Supreme Court refused to grant an additur
where the j u r y awarded the plaintiff $8,201.03 total damages, consisting of
$4,239.63 medical expenses and $3,961.40 general damages for unspecified
injuries arising out of an automobile collision in which the plaintiffs wife was
killed. The Court stated:
The award of damages may be less than the plaintiff wished or even
less t h a n we would have found had we been the jury; b u t it is the
prerogative of the jury to make the determination of damages and we
cannot substitute our judgment for that of the fact finder unless
the evidence compels a finding that reasonable men and women
would, of necessity, come to a different conclusion. The evidence
in this case was not such as would indicate t h a t the j u r y was
actuated by any improper motive, prejudice, or bias in arriving at its
verdict. The plaintiff had a fair trial and that is all he is entitled to.

indicative of cervical sprain, was diagnosed with occipital neuralgia, and testified that he
suffered debilitating headaches five to six times per week to the date of trial. Leleux v. Home
Indem. Co.. 457 So.2d 300 (La. App. 1984)
$5,000 was adequate damages where woman as a result of auto accident received two
lacerations on her scalp, neck injury which left neck severely restricted, injuries to back,
strains of cervical and lumbar regions, and a fractured rib. Clements v. Continental Insurance
Co.. 277 So.2d 714 (La. App. 1973).
$5,000 was adequate damages where accident victim experienced neck strain, ringing
in ears, and pain in neck, which subsided one month after auto accident. McGowan v. Farris.
384 So.2d 544 (La. App. 1980).
$4,500 was adequate damages for auto accident injuries including moderately severe
neck strain, strain of posterior area of chest, strain of lumbosacral area, which gradually
subsided without residual side effects. Joseph v. Aetna Life and Casualty Ins. Co.. 271 So.2d
714 (La. App. 1972).
$4,000 was adequate damages for cervical and lumbar strain received in auto accident.
Potts v. Hollier. 344 So.2d 70 (La. App. 1977).
$4,000 was adequate damages for moderately severe cervical strain received in auto
accident that aggravated pre-existing arthritis. Dobard v. Becnel. 345 So.2d 147 (La. App.
1977).
$3,000 was adequate damages for pain and suffering, cervical strain, contusions of
musculature of right flank received in auto accident. Bovles v. Bridgeman. 342 So.2d 1150
(La. App. 1977).
$3,000 was adequate damages for neck injuries received in rear-end collision requiring
medication and use of cervical collar, and causing continued discomfort and stiffness two years
after injury, no residual disability. Bankston v. Cooper. 371 So.2d 654 (La. App. 1979).
24

575 P.2d at 180 (emphasis added).
In Mever v. Bartholomew. 690 P.2d 558 (Utah 1984), the Utah Supreme
Court refused to grant an additur to a $23,000 verdict for a serious eye injury
requiring multiple surgeries, leaving the victim with only 7 5 % normal rotational
use of the affected eye. In denying the request for additur, the Court discussed
Bodon v. S u h r m a n n . 8 Utah 2d 42, 327 P.2d 826 (1958), the first Utah case
recognizing additur in a personal injury context (in which case the Court added
$400 to a $100 judgment). The Court in Mever stated:
There is no reasonable basis for relativity of the two sums in that and
this case to show adequacy or inadequacy of damages "appearing to
have been given under the influence of passion or prejudice," under
Rule 59.
Shortly after the Bodon case, we had occasion again to entertain
the question of "inadequacy of damages" u n d e r the Rule.* 5 In
language that is dispositive of the instant case, we said:
Although the evidence introduced could have justified a
larger verdict than granted, the evidence . . . was not so
certain that the amount granted is so inadequate as to
make it appear that it [the verdict] was given under the
influence of passion or prejudice . . . . Under such a state
of facts we do not interfere with the judgment of the jury.
Bodon v. Suhrmann, . . . cited by appellant h a s not
changed the reasons upon which this court will change
an award of damages by a jury.
In a case with facts remarkably similar to the one at bar, Dupuis v. Nielson.
624 P.2d 685 (Utah 1981), the Court similarly refused to grant an additur or new
trial. In D u p u i s . involving a rear-end accident, the Court granted the plaintiff a

15 Citing Sprunt v. Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad. 9 Utah 2d 142, 340 P.2d 85
(1959); Jensen v. Eakins. 575 P.2d 179 (Utah 1978).
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directed verdict on liability (as in this case). Notwithstanding evidence that the
plaintiff had to leave her former work because of the injury, and that she suffered
"continual headaches, pain when bending her neck, and pain in performing
simple tasks such as opening j a r s and dressing herself {id. at 686), the jury
returned a verdict for $1,000 in general damages (plus special damages). The
Court stated:
[W]hen the damages are not so inadequate as to Indicate a disregard
of the evidence by the jury, a court is not empowered to entertain a
motion for an additur. . . . Plaintiffs contention t h a t the award of
damages is inadequate in light of the evidence is without merit. The
evidence does not compel a finding that reasonable persons would
have reached a different measure of damages.
624 P.2d at 686.
The most recent Utah case addressing the issue of inadequacy of damages
in a personal injury case, which is also factually similar to the case at bar, most
dramatically demonstrates why it was improper to grant an additur. In Onyeabor
v. Pro Roofing. Inc.. 787 P.2d 525 (Utah App. 1990), the plaintiff was injured in
an intersection collision. The two drivers' vision of each other was obstructed,
although the plaintiff (unlike Terry in this case) did see and try to avoid the
defendant's vehicle. The collision caused minor damage to the two vehicles. The
plaintiff claimed a herniated lumbar disc and "closed-head brain injury a n d / o r
post-traumatic syndrome." {id. at 526) The plaintiff alleged damage in excess of
$1,100,000, and also claimed that he was "permanently and totally disabled from
future meaningful employment." {id.) After an extensive trial, the jury awarded
total damages of $16,850 (similar to the $17,000 awarded by the j u r y in this
case). The Court observed that "[t]he jury's verdict obviously reflects the fact that
26

they believed Plaintiffs evidence of a back injury, b u t either did not believe that
there was a head injury or that it was not caused by the accident." (id. at 530)
The Court also concluded that the amounts awarded "appear to be reasonable,
particularly in view of other evidence that plaintiff may have had a preexisting
back condition which was aggravated by the accident and an incident in a 'karate
class/" Id.™
The Court in Onyeabor also observed, with respect to the question of
causation of the alleged brain injury, that "[t]his hotly disputed question of fact
was for the jury, whose exclusive province it is to weigh the evidence and
determine the credibility of witnesses. . . . Thus, plaintiff simply failed to convince
the jury of his entire case." Id.
The Court's comments in Onyeabor are equally applicable in this case.
Whether the trial court or this Court would have awarded a larger amount is
beside the point. The jury did its duty, the verdict is consistent with the evidence
it chose to believe, there is no evidence that it acted out of prejudice or passion,
and the plain fact is that Terry and her attorney failed to sustain their burden of
persuasion to justify a higher damage award. There is no basis for an additur or
a new trial for Terry.
D.

The trial court abused its discretion in awarding an additur.

Under Utah law, an abuse of discretion occurs when the tribunal's decision
is "beyond the limits of reasonability." State v. Hamilton. 827 P.2d 232, 239-40

*6 Note that this case was decided subsequent to Biswell v. Duncan. 742 P.2d 80 (Utah
1987), on which Terry relies. Thus Biswell does not stand for the proposition that substantial
damages must be awarded for a pre-existing condition that is aggravated by a subsequent
accident.
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(Utah 1992); Barnard v. Sutliff. 202 Utah Adv. Rep. 17, 20 (Utah App. 1992);
State v. O'NeiL 1993 WL 41765 n. 5 (Utah App., filed Feb. 12, 1993). In Tolman
v. Salt Lake County Attorney. 818 P.2d 23 (Utah App. 1991), this Court more fully
articulated the meaning of "abuse of discretion/ It stated:
Discretion . . . "is limited in that it m u s t be exercised within the
confines of the legal standards set by appellate courts . . . . " . . .
Discretion may best be viewed as an arena bounded by the law,
within which the tribunal may exercise its judgment as it sees fit.
By an "abuse of discretion" . . . "is m e a n t a clearly
erroneous conclusion and judgment . . . . It does not
imply intentional wrong or bad faith or misconduct, nor
any reflection on the judge. It is a legal term to indicate
that the appellate court is of the opinion that there was
commission of error of law in the circumstances. It is an
improvident exercise of discretion; an error of law.
. . . . Obviously, the making of a clearly erroneous factual finding is
an abuse of discretion, as is acting unreasonably or misinterpreting
the law. In essence, a reviewing court never overturns a lower
tribunal unless there has been an abuse of discretion.
818 P.2d at 26-27 (citations omitted)
In the present case, the trial court abused its discretion, as that term is
defined above, by infringing on the jury's prerogative to determine damages,
because it awarded an additur without determining that the jury had acted under
the influence of passion or prejudice.

Even if the court's ruling granting the

additur could be construed to imply a finding of passion or prejudice, it would
still be an abuse of discretion, because there is no evidence that the jury acted
improperly in any way. The jury had every right to determine which special
damages had been proved by a preponderance of the evidence, and to award
general damages of $5,000 on evidence that Terry had not required medical
treatment except on three occasions in three years, that her treating physician
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diagnosed nothing more than a cervical strain, and that she could control her
pain through the use of over-the-counter Tylenol®.
Whereas the law permitted the trial court to award an additur only upon
evidence t h a t "compels
necessity"w

a finding that reasonable men and women would, of

award a different amount of damages, the trial court nonetheless

overrode the jury's prerogative without any finding of prejudice or passion, nor
that the jury's verdict was not supported by the evidence, nor that it was against
law. Thus, in granting an additur under these circumstances, the trial court went
"beyond the limits of reasonability."

State v. Hamilton. 827 P.2d 232, 240 (Utah

1992). That constitutes an abuse of discretion.
CONCLUSION
The only prejudice in this case was exhibited by the trial court, which
excluded key defense witnesses, severely restricted the testimony of the only
medical expert the defense was permitted to call, then removed the issue of
comparative negligence from the jury, despite Terry's own testimony that she took
her eyes off the other vehicle after it came to a stop and never saw it thereafter
until t h e collision, and despite the testimony of Terry's own

accident

reconstruction expert, who testified that Terry had adequate time and ability to
avoid the accident.
The jury, to its credit, saw the weakness in Terry's damage case, concluded
t h a t most of the claimed special damages were speculative, and t h a t Terry's
claimed pain and suffering were more ephemeral t h a n substantial, and awarded

17 Jensen v. Eakins. 575 P.2d 179, 180 (Utah 1978) (emphasis added).
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damages accordingly, as it was legally entitled to do. Terry had plainly failed to
carry her burden of proof of damages in a higher amount.
The trial court, adding insult to injury, then usurped the jury's findings on
damages, and awarded an additur that quadrupled the general damages, without
the required finding (much less any evidence) t h a t the j u r y was u n d e r the
influence of passion or prejudice, nor that there was any misconduct on the part
of the jury. In doing so, the trial court plainly abused its discretion. Appellants
are entitled to have the original jury verdict reinstated, and therefore request this
Court to reverse the Amended Judgment on Special Verdict, with Additur, and to
order reinstatement of the original judgment.
Respectfully submitted this 2nd day of March, 1993.
U S WEST Communications, Inc.

By
Floyd A. Jensen, Attorney

Mailing Certificate
I hereby certify that on this 2nd day of March, 1993, I caused two copies of
the foregoing Brief of Appellants to be mailed by United States mail, postage
prepaid, to the following:
Jeffery C. Peatross
IVIE & YOUNG
48 North University Avenue
P.O. Box 672
Provo, Utah 84603
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ADDENDA TO THE BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

Request for an Additur or a New Trial
Ruling granting additur
Acceptance of Additur
Amended Judgment on Special Verdict, with Additur

ADDENDUM A
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R. PHIL IVIE, #3657
JEFFERY C. PEATROSS, #5221
IVIE & YOUNG
Attorneys for Plaintiff
48 North University Avenue
P.O. Box 672
Provo, Utah 84603
(801) 375-3000
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
CORAL TERRY,

PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST FOR AN
ADDITUR OR A NEW TRIAL

Plaintiff,
vs.
WILLIAM C. BOWLES, an
individual, and US WEST
COMMUNICATIONS, dba MOUNTAIN
STATES TELEPHONE AND
TELEGRAPH COMPANY,

Civil No. 910400402
Judge George E. Ballif

Defendants.
COMES NOW the plaintiff, Coral Terry, by and through
her attorney Jeffery C. Peatross, and requests Additur or in the
alternative a new trial on the issue of damages pursuant to Rule
59(a)(5) and (6), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

DATED AND SIGNED this 2J-—' "day of June, 1992.

fEF^ERY C. PEATROSS
IVIE & YOUNG
Attorneys for Plaintiff

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy
of the foregoing Motion for Additur or a New Trial, with postage
prepaid thereon this /^<^*

day of June, 1992, to the following:

Floyd A. Jensen
250 Bell Plaza, 16th Floor
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

Secretary
Secretary
9190-5.K51
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
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**********

CORAL TERRY,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case Number:

910400402

RULING
GEORGE E. BALLIF, SENIOR JUDGE

WILLIAM C. BOWLES,
Defendant.
**********

This matter is before the Court on the plaintiff's motion
for an additure or in the alternative, a new trial.
The matter of liability was directed by the Court.

The

issue of causation of plaintiff's injury by the defendant was
found by the jury and an award of $12,000.00 for specials and
$5,000.0 general damages was made.
The foregoing was based on the Court's instructions that
on the finding of causation the jury was to assess damages for the
full amount of plaintiff's injuries although the defendants
negligence may have aggravated or light up a latent, dormant, or
asymptomatic condition.
In assessing such damages the jury awarded only little
more than half the medical and other special damages testified to
by the only witnesses on this point called by the plaintiff.
The jurors assessment of general damages did not take
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into account the pain and suffering of plaintiff to date, nor that
attributable to the surgery, as testified to by Dr. Smith.
Based on the foregoing considerations the Court grants
the plaintiff's motion and directs that the sum of $15,000.00 be
added to the judgment or if defendant refuses such additure, the
Court grants a new trial of this matter.
Dated thisZ-5 day of July, 1992.
BY THE COURT

BALLIF,/SR.

cc:

R. Phil Ivie, Esq.
Floyd Jensen, Esq.
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FLOYD A. JENSEN, Bar #1672
Attorney for Defendants
250 Bell Plaza, 16th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 237-7418
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OP UTAH

CORAL TERRY,

ACCEPTANCE OP ADDITUR

Plaintiff and Appellee,
vs.

Civil No. 910400402

WILLIAM C. BOWLES, an individual,
and U S WEST COMMUNICATIONS,
dba MOUNTAIN STATES
TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH
COMPANY,

Judge Lynn W. Davis

Defendants and Appellants.

Defendants William C. Bowles and U S WEST Communications, Inc.
hereby accept the conditional additur ordered by the Court in its Ruling
dated July 23, 1992, but reserve their right to appeal from the amended
judgment that will be entered incorporating and reflecting such additur, and
do not intend hereby to waive any such right of appeal.
This election is made as a result of the order of the Utah Supreme
Court dated October 13, 1992, which summarily dismissed Defendants'
appeal from the original judgment on the grounds that the appeal was
premature and that the Supreme Court therefore lacked jurisdiction. That
ruling implied that the only means of obtaining appellate review of the order
granting an additur is for Defendants to make an election between a new

..,

trial and an additur. Based on the Supreme Court's statement in State v.
General Oil Co.. 22 Utah 2d 60, 448 R2d 718, 719 (1968) (aWe need not
determine whether or not the court's ruling [granting] an additur was
erroneous inasmuch as that issue has now become moot by the trial de
novo."), Defendants believe that the Supreme Court might refuse to review
the additur if Defendants elected a new trial; therefore, it appears that the
only other alternative means of obtaining appellate review is by electing an
additur and appealing from the amended judgment.
Dated this

c

1

day of November, 1992.
U S WEST Communications, Inc.
By

^Z'\/\/€U,
Floyd A. Jensen, Senior Counsel

Certificate of Mailing
I hereby certify that on this ' day of November, 1992, I mailed, by
United States Mail, postage prepaid, a copy of the foregoing ACCEPTANCE
OF ADDITUR to the following:
Jeffery C. Peatross
IVIE & YOUNG
48 North University Avenue
P.O. Box 672
Provo, Utah 84603
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FLOYD A. JENSEN, Bar #1672
Attorney for Defendants
250 Bell Plaza, 16th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 237-7418
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

CORAL TERRY,
Plaintiff and Appellee,

AMENDED JUDGMENT ON
SPECIAL VERDICT, WITH
ADDITUR

vs.
WILLIAM C. BOWLES, an individual,
and U S WEST COMMUNICATIONS,
dba MOUNTAIN STATES
TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH
COMPANY,
j

Civil No. 910400402
Judge Lynn W. Davis

Defendants and Appellants.

The above entitled action having come before the Court for trial on the 26th,
27th and 28th days of May, 1992. The plaintiff having been represented by JeflFery
C. Peatross, IVIE & YOUNG, and defendants having been represented by Floyd
Jensen, testimony having been taken and argument of counsel having been
heard, the jury returned a special verdict as follows:
a

l.
Was the negligence of defendant, Bowles, in the January 30, 1989,
accident a proximate cause of plaintiff, Coral Terry's injuries?
Yes _ X _
No
a
2.
If your answer to the above question is yes, proceed to answer
question number 3. If your answer is no, so indicate and sign and return this
Special Verdict to the court.
a
3.
What sum would fairly compensate plaintiff, Coral Terry, for the

J

* *

i

damages, if any, which she sustained as a result of the incident:
a
A. For special damages
$ 12.000
a

B.

For general damages

$ 5.000"

Based on the foregoing verdict, on June 12,1992, the Court (Ballif, J.)
entered a Judgment on Special Verdict in the amount of "SEVENTEEN
THOUSAND DOLLARS ($17,000) with interest to be included on special damages
of $12,000 from the date of the loss until entry of judgment at the rate of 8% per
annum, together with costs in the amount of $53Q.Q0

to assessed pursuant to

Rule 54 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.*
On July 23, 1992, pursuant to and granting Plaintiffs Request for an
Additur or a New Trial, filed June 2, 1992, the Court (Ballif, Ret. J.) entered its
ruling granting an additur in the amount of $15,000, or if Defendants refused
such additur, a new trial.
Defendants having timely filed their Acceptance of Additur dated November
10, 1992, and good cause appearing, the Court hereby enters judgment in favor of
Plaintiff and against Defendants in the amount of THIRTY TWO THOUSAND
DOLLARS ($32,000) with interest to be included on special damages of $12,000
from the date of the loss until entry of judgment at the rate of 8% per annum,
together with costs in the amount of $
to Rule 54, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

, to be assessed pursuant
-

DATED AND SIGNED this J L _ day of

llLte£AnJ&
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Certificate of Mailing
I hereby certify that on this J_ day of November, 1992,1 mailed, by
United States Mail, postage prepaid, a copy of the foregoing AMENDED
JUDGMENT ON SPECIAL VERDICT, WITH ADDITUR to the following:
Jeffery C. Peatross
IVIE & YOUNG
48 North University Avenue
P.O. Box 672
Provo,Utah 84603
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